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Abstract—Software Defined Networks (SDN) decouple the
forwarding and control planes from each other. The control
plane is assumed to have a global knowledge of the underlying
physical and/or logical network topology so that it can monitor,
abstract and control the forwarding plane. In our paper, we
present solutions that install an optimal or near-optimal (i.e.,
within 14% of the optimal) number of static forwarding rules on
switches/routers so that any controller can verify the topology
connectivity and detect/locate link failures at data plane speeds
without relying on state updates from other controllers. Our
upper bounds on performance indicate that sub-second link
failure localization is possible even at data-center scale networks.
For networks with hundreds or few thousand links, tens of
milliseconds of latency is achievable.
I. INTRODUCTION
SDNs are emerging as a principal component of future IT,
ISP, and telco infrastructures. It promises to change networks
from a collection of independent autonomous boxes to a well-
managed, flexible, multi-tenant transport fabric [10], [11]. As
core principles, SDNs (i) decouple the forwarding and control
plane, (ii) provide well-defined forwarding abstractions (e.g.,
pipeline of flow tables), (iii) present standard programmatic
interfaces to these abstractions (e.g., OpenFlow), and (iv)
expose high level abstractions (e.g., VLAN, topology graph,
etc.) as well as interfaces to these service layer abstractions
(e.g., access control, path control, etc.).
To fulfill its promise to convert the network to a well-
managed fabric, presumably, a logically centralized network
controller is in charge of the whole forwarding plane in an
end-to-end fashion with a global oversight of the forwarding
elements and their inter-connections (i.e., nodes and links of
the forwarding topology) on that plane. However, this might
not be always true. For instance, there might be failures (soft-
ware/hardware failures, buggy code, configuration mistakes,
management plane overload, etc.) that disrupt the communi-
cation between the controller and a strict subset of forwarding
elements. In another interesting case, the forwarding plane
might be composed of multiple administrative domains under
the foresight of distinct controllers. If controller of a given
domain fails to respond or has very poor monitoring and
reporting, then the other controllers might have a stale view
of the overall network topology leading to suboptimal or
infeasible routing decisions.
For many systems that require a high grade of network
availability and performance, it is essential for a controller
to be able to verify the forwarding plane topology and iden-
tify link failures at forwarding plane speeds even under the
aforementioned conditions. To attain this, we propose solutions
that allocate a fraction of forwarding rules at each switch
for control flows that can verify the topological connectivity,
detect link failures, and locate one or more failed links. Our
solutions are either optimal or order optimal in number of
forwarding rules to be allocated for control flows as well
as in number of control messages. Although our solutions
are not optimal in latency in general, we can achieve tens
of milliseconds of latency for topologies with 1000 links.
For data-center scale topologies with 100K links, we present
how one can effectively trade-off overhead in hardware rules
and/or control messages to achieve sub-second latencies. Our
solutions can guarantee locating an arbitrary single link failure,
while it can also probabilistically locate multiple failed links.
We show over a simple example why one cannot guarantee
locating multiple link failures over arbitrary topologies and
failure scenarios. We also present our simulation results over
real topologies to quantify the overhead of our solution and
its success of locating more than one failed link.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we pro-
vide the detailed system model. In Section III, we focus on
verification of topology connectivity and establish optimality
results as well as performance bounds. In Section IV, we
turn our attention to locating a single but arbitrary link
failure. We provide an order optimal solution and present
performance bounds on important metrics. In Section V, we
extend the results to multiple link failures. In Section VI, we
show performance results using publicly available, real world
topologies. In Section VII, we cover the most related works.
Finally, we conclude in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Architecture
The main features of the network architecture is captured
in Fig. 1. Our system model follows the OpenFlow model
[11]. Network consists of a forwarding plane and a control
plane. The forwarding plane consists of forwarding elements
(will use the term switch interchangeably), each supporting
a finite number of {match, action} rules. A match pattern
is defined using incoming port ID and packet headers using
ternary values 0, 1, or * (i.e., don’t care). In essence, each
match pattern defines a network flow. The following actions
on a particular flow match are allowed: forward to outgoing
port ID, drop packet, pop outer header field, push outer header
2field, overwrite header field. Regardless of match length and
number of actions taken per matching (e.g., switch can first
rewrite a particular field in the packet header, then push an
MPLS label, and finally forward to a particular interface),
we will count the cost of each flow matching rule as one
forwarding rule. The forwarding plane in Fig. 1 has seven
switches (s1 through s7) and nine interfaces/links between
them. We assume that each link is bidirectional, i.e., a switch
can both receive and send over the same link. The model is
applicable to cases where multiple interfaces exist between
the same pair of switches, there are logical interfaces (e.g.,
a preconfigured tunnel with a tunnel ID configured on both
ends), or pairs of directional links in opposite directions
interconnect the same pair of switches.
The control plane consists of one or more controllers.
A switch can be programmed (i.e., forwarding rules are
installed) by only one controller (called master controller). In
contrast, a controller can install forwarding rules on multiple
switches using control interfaces (depicted by red dotted lines
in the figure). The control interfaces can be in-band (i.e.,
a slice of the forwarding plane are used for inter-controller
and controller-switch communication) or out-of-band (i.e., a
separate physical network interconnects controllers with each
other and switches) or a mixture of both. We refer to the
subset of switches that a controller can send packets to and
install rules on as its control domain D. The rest of the
switches constitutes its complementary domain D. For C3,
D = {s4, s7} and D = {s1, s2, s3, s5, s6}, i.e., C3 can send
control packets to and install forwarding rules on s4 and s7.
To install a rule on a switch in its D (e.g., s1), C3 must send
its request to the master controller (e.g., C1) of that switch.
Switches are only allowed to check the health of their
local forwarding interfaces and report to the controllers using
control interfaces. Therefore, a controller cannot receive any
failure notifications for the interfaces between the switches in
its complementary domain, e.g., an interface failure between
s2 and s3 is not reported to C3 by s4 or s7.
One way for a controller to learn about the failures within
its D is to receive state updates from other controllers in
charge of D. This path however might be slow or might
be disrupted for various reasons (e.g., configuration mistakes,
controller overload, software/hardware failures on the control
plane, DOS attacks) or might be simply untrusted. As long
as the overhead is low, installing static rules for verifying
connectivity or policies of D would be very valuable under
these circumstances.
Once these static forwarding rules are in place, a controller
can learn about the topology failures within its D by sending
control messages from its D into its D and listen to the
responses. These messages constitute control flows. Since
the controller cannot install new rules in D, a priori static
forwarding rules must be installed on D switches for the
control flows. Finding these static rules given the forwarding
plane topology for optimal network diagnosis is the focus
of this paper. Once the forwarding plane topology is learned
and consistently shared across the controllers, any controller
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Fig. 1: System Model
can compute these static rules, distribute to other controllers,
and each controller installs them in their current D. Once the
static rules are confirmed, controllers can start using them for
network diagnosis.
Our system model does not assume that D and D are
fixed or known a priori. C3 for instance might have had
functional control interfaces to other switches in D, but they
may have been lost. A priori C3 does not have any clue on
which control interfaces would be failed. In another case, there
might be a dynamic partitioning of the forwarding plane such
that a controller become in charge of different forwarding
elements over time based on some optimization logic. Not
assuming fixed D and D may be useful even when they
are actually fixed. If multiple controllers coexist each with a
different D and D, instead of setting static rules with respect
to each controller, it would be more efficient (i.e., requires
less forwarding rules for control flows) to set up static rules
independent of what D and D are actually.
In contrast to D, a controller can dynamically install new
forwarding rules on its D for control flows. As it will be clear
in the later sections, we will make use of this advantage to
enforce loopback of the control flows to the controller.
B. Failure Scenarios
We will differentiate between two different failure scenarios:
(i) Symmetric failures, where a bidirectional link is either func-
tional in both directions or non-functional in either direction.
(ii) Asymmetric failures, where a bidirectional link can fail in
one direction but not necessarily in the other direction.
For symmetric failures, it suffices to visit an interface in
any direction to check its health. Thus, if symmetric failures
are the most common scenarios, then one can specifically plan
network diagnosis for such more probable incidents and save
costs. We will model the forwarding plane as an undirected
graph Gu(S,E) in this case. Here, S is the set of vertices,
where there is a 1-1 mapping from the forwarding elements to
the vertices in S and E is the set of edges, where there is 1-1
mapping from the forwarding interfaces to the edges in E.
For asymmetric failures, both directions of the link must
be examined. The problem is more constrained and imposes
higher diagnosis costs. However, as we will see later in the
paper, we can find optimal solutions. We will model the
forwarding plane as a directed graph Gd(S, ~E) in this case.
3Here, ~E is the set of arcs, where there is 1-1 mapping from
each direction of the forwarding interfaces to the arcs in ~E.
C. Problem Statement and Cost Metrics
Given the forwarding plane topology and without any in-
formation on D, we would like to compute and install static
forwarding rules such that as long as controller is master of at
least one switch (i.e., |D| ≥ 1) it can (i) verify the topology
connectivity and (ii) locate link failures.
Static forwarding rules can be interpreted as one or more
walks on the undirected (Gu(S,E)) or directed (Gd(S, ~E))
topology graph of the forwarding plane. Without loss of gen-
erality, we only consider closed walks (i.e., cycles) since such
walks are the only ones that can satisfy the constraint |D| ≥ 1.
Let Ω represent the set of all closed walks on Gu. Suppose
we picked the subset of walks Ωj = {Wj1, . . . ,WjK} ∈ Ω
to diagnose the forwarding plane. Then, we can measure the
cost of Ωj as follows.
1) Number of control messages: Each walk is traversed by
a different control packet as otherwise we cannot differentiate
among the walks. Thus, the overhead in number of control
messages is equal to the number of walks we picked (i.e., K).
2) Latency: Each control packet k traverses the walk Wjk
and thus experiences a latency of τ × Lk. Here, Lk is the
length of walk Wjk and τ is the switching delay for a control
packet. Depending on whether the walks can be executed in
parallel or not, the overall latency figure would vary. If walks
can be done in parallel, then the total latency is given by
τ × maxk Lk. If walks must be done sequentially, then the
total latency becomes τ ×
∑
k Lk. Any hybrid solution (i.e.,
walks are grouped together, within a group they are executed
in parallel while across groups they are executed in sequence)
would have a latency between these two extremes.
3) Number of static rules: Let ~E(Wjk) represent the set
of arcs traversed by Wjk . If an arc is traversed multiple
times within the same walk or across walks, it can share
the same forwarding rule at the head of arc (i.e., sending
switch).1For each unique arc in any Wjk, there must be a
distinct forwarding rule as without such a rule traversing the
corresponding link in the specific direction is not possible.
Accordingly, we can express the total number of static for-
warding rules as |
⋃
k
~E(Wjk)|, i.e., the cardinality of union
of arc sets belonging to distinct walks used for diagnosis.
For an arbitrary topology, it is not possible to optimize
each of these cost metrics simultaneously. In the following
sections, we present solutions for topology verification and
locate an arbitrary (but) single link failure. Our focus will be
mainly on minimizing the total number of static forwarding
rules. Our solutions are either order-optimal or optimum in
1The easiest way of proving this is to let controller use source based routing.
In this brute-force approach, each arc is assigned a unique label. The whole
route is specified in the packet header by concatenating the labels of the links
in the order they are visited. Each switch has a matching rule for the label and
the action consists of popping the outermost label and forwarding. However,
for data-center scale topologies, this would create very large control packets.
A better way is to let switches do the packet labeling/tagging where necessary
(e.g., see Section III-C).
this metric. We will also quantify the costs in terms of latency
and number of control messages. As extensions, we will
consider how adding more static rules can reduce latency and
probabilistically locate multiple link failures. We will also
provide how latency and number of control messages can
be traded off. In the final part, we exemplify why locating
multiple link failures is not a solvable problem for arbitrary
topologies and present simulation results about the success of
locating multiple link failures using our solution.
III. VERIFYING TOPOLOGY CONNECTIVITY
For both symmetric and asymmetric failure cases, our
solutions are based on first computing a single walkWopt that
has the shortest length across all walks that visit each edge in
Gu or arc inGd at least once. For symmetric failure case, our
solution is order optimal (and tight) in number of static rules.
For asymmetric failures, our solution is optimum in number of
static rules. For both cases, solutions are optimum in number
of control messages as they require only one control message.
A. Symmetric Failure Scenarios
Computing Wopt is in general known as Chinese Postman
Problem. For undirected connected graphs such as Gu(S,E),
Wopt can be computed in polynomial time [4]. Ideally, we
want Wopt to be an Euler cycle that visits each edge in E
exactly once. A well-known necessary and sufficient condition
for existence of an Euler cycle in a connected undirected graph
is to have every vertex to have an even degree. When an Euler
cycle exists, Ω∗ = {Wopt} becomes the optimum choice for
the verification of topology connectivity. Ω∗ minimizes both
the total number of static forwarding rules and the total number
of control messages. Specifically, Ω∗ requires |E| static rules
and one control message. The latency of Ω∗ becomes τ ×|E|.
Unfortunately, not all forwarding topologies have Euler
cycles. E.g., the forwarding plane in Fig. 1 has no Euler cycles.
Remember that when we want to optimize the number of static
rules, it is not the length of Wopt (denoted as Lopt), but the
cardinality of ~E(Wopt) that must be minimized. Denote the
total number of duplicate arcs for a given walk W as κ(W).
Then, we can express the total number of static rules byWopt
as (Lopt − κ(Wopt)). After stating the next lemma, we can
at least claim order optimality for Ω∗ in number of static
rules, i.e., |E| ≤ (Lopt − κ(Wopt)) ≤ 2|E|. The solution
is obviously optimum in number of control messages. The
latency can be written as τ × (Lopt − κ(Wopt)).
Lemma 3.1: In Wopt, no edge is traversed more than
twice. In other words: Lopt ≤ 2|E|.
Proof: Suppose an edge is traversed more than twice.
Then, we can construct an undirected graph Gu(S′,E′) from
Gu(S,E) such that S = S′ and E ⊂ E′ with each occurrence
of an edge in Wopt has a 1-1 mapping to E′. Since Wopt
is an Euler cycle on Gu(S′,E′), every vertex must have an
even degree as this is a necessary and sufficient condition for
connected graphs [4]. However, if there are more than two
edges between two vertices as in this case, one can remove
two edges at a time between these vertices until there remains
4one or two edges between the same vertices. Since we started
with vertices that have even degrees, removing an even number
of edges would preserve the same property. In other words,
an Euler path exists after these edge deletions such that it is
strictly shorter thanWopt and visited every edge in E at least
once. Hence, Wopt cannot be the shortest cycle for topology
verification, which is a contradiction.
We can express a tighter lower bound for the number of
static rules than |E| by counting bridge links.
Definition An edge (if omitted) that partitions an undirected
graph into two disconnected sub-graphs is called a bridge.
When a walk on a graph starts on one side of a bridge,
if it crosses the bridge in one direction, it has to cross the
same bridge in the reverse direction to come back to the
starting point. Using this trivial observation, one can state the
following lower bound on total number of forwarding rules.
Lemma 3.2 (Lower Bound): Topology verification requires
at least |E|+ |B| forwarding rules.
Proof: For topology verification, each edge on Gu must
be traversed in at least one direction. Moreover, each bridge
must be crossed in both directions as otherwise we cannot loop
back to the starting point. Thus, there are at least |E| + |B|
unique arcs that must be visited. Each uniquely visited arc
requires at least one forwarding rule at the head node. Thus,
we need at least |E|+ |B| forwarding rules.
All the edges in tree, star, and linear topologies are bridges
rendering the lower bound 2|E|. Hence, Ω∗ is indeed the op-
timum solution in number of static rules over such topologies.
Note that the lower bound given by Lemma 3.2 may not be
achievable by Wopt in general. Though, it can be achievable
by a longer walk. An example is depicted in Figure 2. The
forwarding plane topology represented by the leftmost graph
has no bridges and has |E| = 8. Lemma 3.2 indicates
that we need at least 8 forwarding rules. Solving Chinese
Postman Problem however leads to an optimal walk Wopt
with Lopt = 10. The corresponding logical ring is shown at
the center of Figure 2. The walk traverses the arc e41 twice,
leading to κ = 1. Hence, Wopt requires (Lopt−κ) = 9 static
forwarding rules. This is strictly larger than the lower bound.
The difference is due to the edge between s2 and s3 as it must
be traversed in both directions requiring installation of one rule
at s2 and one rule at s3. Other candidate solutions for Wopt
suffer from a similar non-bridge link reversal. This situation
is avoided over the logical ring constructed by a longer walk
as shown by the rightmost ring topology in the figure. Instead
of moving directly from s3 to s2 (as in the optimal walk),
a longer path s3 − s4 − s1 − s2 is taken. As a result, the
ring has 12 hops with κ = 4 (e12, e34, e41 occur two, two,
and three times, respectively). Thus, this longer walk requires
(L− κ) = 8 static rules achieving the lower bound.
Although optimality in number of static rules and number
of control messages can be achieved by a longer walk, we
may pay a substantial penalty in delay for large topologies as
the walk is much longer. Thus, it would be more desirable to
pay a small penalty in number of static rules and do not incur
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Fig. 2: Example of a topology, where Wopt cannot achieve
the lower bound in Lemma 3.2, but a longer walk achieves it.
Algorithm 1 Heuristic for reducing (Lopt − κ(Wopt))
Step 1: Find a solutionWopt to Chinese Postman Problem.
Let vk denote the absolute position of each hop on Wopt
and f(vk) is the actual switch at that position.
Step 2: Construct set Λ such that a pair of arcs {eij , eji} ∈
Λ iff both eij , eji appear in Wopt and the corresponding
edge between si and sj in Gu is not a bridge.
while Λ 6= ∅ do
Step 3: Remove the pair of arcs {eij , eji} from Λ that are
closest to each other on Wopt. Without this pair, Wopt
divides into two parts. Denote the part that keeps si as
W1 and the part that keeps sj as W2.
Step 4: Construct set Γ such that {vk, vl} ∈ Γ iff f(vk) =
f(vl), vk is on W1 and vl is on W2.
while Γ 6= ∅ do
Step 5: Remove a pair {vk, vl} from Γ.
Step 6: Denote the cycle that starts from vk on W1 and
ends at vl on W2 as W3. Denote the cycle that starts
from vl on W2 and ends at vk on W1 as W4. Construct
a new walk W′opt by stitching W3 to the reverse of
walk W4 (or equivalently stitching the reverse walk of
W3 to W4).
if κ(W′opt) > κ(Wopt) then
Step 7: Wopt :=W′opt and break.
end if
end while
Step 8: Remove any pair {eij , eji} from Λ if either of its
arcs is not on Wopt.
end while
additional delays by sticking with Wopt. In general, there is
more than one solution to Chinese Postman Problem (CPP).
Then, we should search for a solution of CPP that achieves
the minimum (Lopt − κ(Wopt)) (or equivalently maximum
κ(Wopt)) to attain lower forwarding rule costs. Algorithm 1
provides a simple transformation on top of an initialWopt that
iterates over the non-bridge links that have both of their arcs
in ~E(Wopt). An example of these iterative transformations is
shown in Fig. 3 based on the forwarding plane topology given
in Fig. 1. In Step 1, initial solution of CPP returns a walk of
length 11 with κ = 0. In Step 2 of the algorithm, we have
Λ = {{e25, e52}, {e36, e63}}. In Step 3 and Step 4, we inspect
the pair {e25, e52} and construct Γ = {{v1, v9}}, respectively.
In Step 6, W3 = s5 → s1 → s2 → s5 is reversed and the rest
of the walk remains the same. The top-right ring in clockwise
5direction depicts newly constructed walk of same length as
before but κ = 1. Hence, it requires one less forwarding rules
than the initial walk. Next iteration starts with this new walk
(bottom-left ring in the figure). There is only one candidate
pair {e36, e63} to consider with Γ = {{v4, v8}}. By reversing
the part of the ring s6 → s3 → s4 → s7 → s6 in Step 6, we
obtain a new walk (bottom-right ring) with κ = 2. Algorithm
terminates at this stage. The newly constructed walk is still a
solution of CPP. Moreover it requires (Lopt − κ(Wopt)) = 9
static rules. Since |E| = 9 in Gu, this is an optimum walk
in number of static forwarding rules. Our evaluations over
real topologies (see Section VI) indicate that Algorithm 1 is
optimum in number of static rules for 60% of the topologies,
and for the rest it stays within 14% of the optimum.
B. Asymmetric Failure Scenarios
Verifying topology connectivity in these scenarios require
one or more control packets to visit each link in both di-
rections. Since there are exactly 2|E| arcs to be visited and
each arc must have a distinct forwarding rule, the number of
static forwarding rules is ≥ 2|E|. Due to our bi-directional
link assumption on Gd(V, ~E), every vertex has equal in-
degree (i.e., the number of incoming arcs) and out-degree
(i.e., the number of outgoing arcs). In connected graphs, this
is a sufficient condition for existence of an Euler cycle [4].
An Euler cycle can be found in Θ(2|E|) steps over Gd.
Remember that an Euler cycle visits every arc in a directed
graph exactly once. Therefore, Ω∗ = {Wopt} is the optimum
solution both in total number of static forwarding rules and
in number of control messages. The latency of this solution,
however, becomes τ × 2|E|.
C. Mapping the Walk to Static Forwarding Rules
Once a walk W is determined, we need to install forwarding
rules at switch si for each arc eij in ~E(W ). The walk and the
set of corresponding forwarding rules must uniquely define a
control flow for topology connectivity. For this purpose, one
of the packet headers is used to identify that this packet is used
to verify topology connectivity. Suppose source IP address
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Fig. 3: Algorithm 1 in action.
TABLE I: Sample Forwarding Rules
SW Matching Rules Actions
s1 src IP == IPA
set VLAN to vlan1
forward to e15
s2 src IP == IPA ∧ VLAN == vlan1 forward to e23
s2 src IP == IPA ∧ VLAN == vlan2 forward to e21
s3 src IP == IPA forward to e36
s4 src IP == IPA
set VLAN to vlan2
forward to e43
s5 src IP == IPA forward to e52
s6 src IP == IPA ∧ VLAN == vlan1 forward to e67
s6 src IP == IPA ∧ VLAN == vlan2 forward to e65
s7 src IP == IPA forward to e74
field is used to this end and a unique local IP address IPA is
assigned. Then, all static forwarding rules for W must match
source IP address to IPA. Table I shows how the closed walk
s1 → s5 → s2 → s3 → s6 → s7 → s4 → s3 → s6 → s5 →
s2 → s1 is realized using 9 forwarding rules. Let us use this
walk example below to describe the basic steps to convert a
walk to a set of static forwarding rules. Note that there are
many other alternatives to define matching rules and actions
to realize the same walk.
If a switch si is visited only once by W , the static rule
does not need to match any other packet field than the one
that identifies the control packet. In our example, s1, s4, and
s7 are visited only once and these switches only need to match
source IP address against IPA to take the correct forwarding
action. If a switch si is visited multiple times but always
forwards to the same link, then again the static rule does not
need to match any other packet field. E.g., s3 and s5 occurs
twice in the example walk yet their forwarding action is the
same: s3 forwards to s6 and s5 forwards to s2. If a switch
si is visited multiple times and forwards to different links at
some of these visits, it requires a separate forwarding rule for
each of these links. In many occasions outgoing link has a
one-to-one mapping to the incoming switch port and thus a
forwarding rule that matches incoming switch port in addition
to the source IP address is sufficient to identify the outgoing
link. When incoming switch port is not sufficient, an additional
header field must be used to identify the outgoing link. One
can use VLAN tagging or MPLS labeling or a custom header
field using an extension to OpenFlow protocol. Suppose we
use VLAN tags as it is a standard feature in most switches
including OpenFlow. Then, we assign a unique VLAN tag for
each outgoing link of sj . In the example, s2 and s6 receive the
same control packet twice from the same incoming interface
and yet must forward to different outgoing links at each
time. Since there is no 1-1 mapping to an incoming interface,
incoming switch port cannot be used as a differentiating field.
Consider first s2. We first assign each outgoing interface a
VLAN tag, vlan1 to e23 and vlan2 to e21. Table I shows the
matching rules with these tags. Now, the question is which
switches as a forwarding action should tag the control packet.
The walk example corresponds to clockwise direction over
the logical ring depicted at the bottom-right corner of Fig. 3.
Iterating back from the tagged interface, we inspect the ring in
the counter clockwise direction to identify a switch that can
6reuse its existing matching rule and add VLAN tagging to
the action set of that matching. For instance, starting from e23
tagged with vlan1 and traversing the ring in counter clockwise
direction, we first reach s5. But, s5 is visited twice on the
ring and has only one forwarding rule. Thus, we rule it out as
a candidate. Moving counter clockwise direction further, we
hit s1 that occurs once in the ring and has one forwarding
rule. Hence, adding VLAN tagging with vlan1 into its action
set would not possibly contradict with another forwarding
decision taken at the same switch. We repeat the process
with e21 tagged with vlan2. Walking in counter clockwise
direction, we reach s5, s6, and s3 that cannot add a tagging
action either because they require an additional forwarding
rule (s5, s3) or their forwarding rules are not yet specified
(e.g., s6). Taking one more step counter clockwise, s4 occurs
only once on the ring and without modifying its matching
rule we can add an additional VLAN tagging action. The only
outstanding switch with no forwarding rules specified is s6
at this point. We first check if we can piggyback on existing
VLAN tags vlan1 and vlan2. Indeed, we can reuse vlan1 for
e67 and vlan2 for e65 as shown in Table I.
D. How do controllers verify the topology connectivity?
By constructing a single closed walk that visits each edge
(or arc) at least once, we formed a logical ring topology
where all switches in the forwarding plane are part of. Thus,
any controller Ci can use any sj ∈ DCi to inject a control
packet for topology verification. In our example in Fig. 1
and using forwarding rules in Table I, C3 can use s4 or
s7 to inject a packet with its source IP address set to IPA.
Similarly C1 can use s1, s2, or s5 and C2 can use s3 or s6
to inject the same control packet. Controllers must initialize
the control packet header properly. E.g., if s2 is the injection
point, according to Table I, not only the source IP address
but also the VLAN tag must be assigned a valid value. In
OpenFlow protocol, controllers can either tell the switch to
which outgoing interface the control packet should be sent to
or tell the switch to treat the packet the same as a packet
coming from a particular incoming interface. In either case,
the injection point is where the walk starts and once a packet
is injected unless there is another rule specified, it would be
indefinitely looped around the logical ring topology. Therefore,
controllers must break the loop by defining a loopback rule
at the injection point so that when the packet completes the
walk, the packet is forwarded back to the controller that
injected the packet. This loopback rule can be dynamically
installed to any switch in a controller’s current control domain.
Naturally, loopback rules must have priority over the static
rules installed for the closed walk. Since multiple controllers
might be simultaneously inspecting the topology, this loopback
rule must uniquely identify the controller. A simple solution is
to use destination MAC address field and install a forwarding
rule at the injection point that matches this field to MAC
address of the injecting controller. Thus, each controller must
also set this field in the packet header before it injects it. An
alternative is to use TTL field in a matching rule (i.e., check
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Fig. 4: An example of bidirectional logical ring topology.
if TTL == 0) and set the initial value of TTL in the control
packet header to the length of the walk at the controller. The
action set then must include a ”decrement TTL” action.
IV. LOCATING AN ARBITRARY BUT SINGLE LINK FAILURE
The solution to locate an arbitrary link failure (when one or
more link failures occur) is based upon constructing a bidirec-
tional logical ring topology. At the high level, controllers inject
multiple control packets each inspecting a different segment of
the ring. Depending on which control messages are received
back or not by the originating controller, the controller not
only detects link failures but also guarantees to locate one of
the failed links.
We use the solution Wopt in the previous section as
a clockwise walk on this logical ring. We also define a
counter clockwise walk Wrevopt by reverting the arcs. E.g., for
Wopt = s1 → s5 → s2 → s3 → s6 → s7 → s4 → s3 →
s6 → s5 → s2 → s1, W
rev
opt = s1 ← s5 ← s2 ← s3 ←
s6 ← s7 ← s4 ← s3 ← s6 ← s5 ← s2 ← s1. Since we
assume bidirectional links, Wrevopt is a valid closed walk over
both Gu and Gd. Further, Wrevopt is also a solution to CPP
(i.e., Wrevopt has length Lopt) and it requires the same number
of forwarding rules as Wopt (i.e., κ(Wopt) = κ(Wrevopt)).
Once the distinct forwarding rules for Wopt and Wrevopt are
installed, any controller can attach to this logical ring from any
switch in its D and inject control packets that traverse it in
either clockwise or counter clockwise direction. Fig. 4 shows
an example of the logical ring constructed for the forwarding
plane topology in Fig. 1. We label each node on the logical ring
uniquely as vi, i = 1, . . . , Lopt. A switch on the forwarding
plane can map to multiple logical nodes on this ring. Define
f(vi) as the surjective function that maps virtual nodes on
the logical ring onto the switches in the forwarding plane. In
Fig. 4, actual switch IDs are shown within the circles and
virtual node labels are indicated next to them.
To be able to locate a link failure, we should be able to
inspect any segment of the logical ring. For this purpose, we
also install bounce back rules at each node of the logical
ring. Suppose we use source IP address field to differentiate
between the directions on the ring, e.g., IPA is used forWopt
and IPB is used for Wrevopt. The bounce back rule at a node
reverses the clockwise walk to the counter clockwise walk.
7Suppose, we assign each virtual node vi a unique IP address
IPvi . A bounce back rule can be specified by using various
fields in the packet header. Let us fix the destination IP address
for this purpose. For each logical node vi, a static bounce back
rule is installed on f(vi) in the following form
If source IP == IPA ∧ destination IP == IPvi then set
source IP to IPB and send back to incoming port.
Note that a bounce back rule must always have a higher
priority than a forwarding rule for Wopt when a packet has
matching fields for both rules. When a controller (e.g., C1
in Fig. 1) injects a packet at f(vin) (e.g., when vin = v11,
f(vin) = s1) with source IP address set to IPA and destination
IP address set to IPvk (e.g., IPv5 ), the packet travels in
clockwise direction from vin (e.g., v11) to vk (e.g., v5) and
travels back to vin in counter clockwise direction over the
constructed logical ring. As before, the controller must install
a loopback rule at injection point f(vin) (e.g., s1) so that the
switch f(vin) forwards the packet back to the controller rather
than forwarding it along Wrevopt.
Once the static rules for Wopt, Wrevopt and bounce back
as well as the dynamic loopback rules are in place, each
controller can fix an injection point on the logical ring and
perform a binary search over the ring by eliminating half of
the links from consideration at each iteration. For instance,
if the link between s4 and s7 fails, C1 can learn about this
using the ring topology in Fig.4 as follows. First C1 determines
whether all the connections are healthy or not by injecting a
control packet for topology verification (e.g., source IP is set
as IPA). The packet never comes back to C1 indicating one
or more link failures. Next, C1 targets half of the logical link
topology by sending a control packet with source IP as IPA
and destination IP as IPv5 . The packet is received back as
there are no failures in this segment. C1 expands the search
up to v8 by setting the source IP as IPA and destination IP as
IPv8 . As this part of the ring includes the failed link, C1 does
not receive the packet back. C1 shrinks the search up to v6
and injects a fourth control packet with source IP set to IPA
and destination IP set to IPv6 . Since C1 does not receive this
fourth packet, but it received back the second packet, C1 can
conclude that the link between s4 and s7 has failed.
Note that when there are multiple link failures, the binary
search mechanism would locate the first failure in the clock-
wise direction from the injection point of the logical ring. E.g.,
if e25 and e47 fail and C1 uses v11 as the injection point, the
procedure above would be able to locate only e25.
A. Cost of Locating a Single Link Failure
Counting the rules for Wopt, Wrevopt, and bounce backs,
the total number of static rules to be installed can be written
as 3Lopt − 2κ(Wopt). Since κ ≥ 0 and Lopt ≤ 2|E|, the
total number of static rules is upper bounded by 6|E| for
both symmetric and asymmetric failures. As locating a link
failure trivially verifies the topology and topology verification
requires at least |E| and 2|E| rules for symmetric and asym-
metric cases, respectively, we can easily establish the order
optimality of our solution.
Including the topology verification stage, the solution re-
quires at most 1 + ⌈log2(Lopt)⌉ control messages to be
injected. Interpreting each control packet as a binary letter,
|E| edges and 2|E| arcs cannot be all checked with less than
log2(|E|) and log2(2|E|) messages, respectively. Hence, we
also have order optimality in number of control packets for
both symmetric and asymmetric cases.
We can find the best case and worst case time delays as
follows. For simplification, suppose Lopt is a power of two.
The best case delay happens when each subsequent control
message travels a shorter distance (i.e., exactly half of the
previous one). Hence, the best case failure scenario is when the
failed link occurs on the logical ring next to the injection point
in the clockwise direction. Brute-force summation over these
paths including the topology verification stage amounts to
(3Lopt−2) hops in total. The worst case delay happens when
each subsequent control message travels a longer distance (i.e.,
increase exactly by half of the not inspected part of the ring).
In other words, the worst case failure scenario happens when
the failed link occurs on the logical ring next to the injection
point in the counter clockwise direction. Again a brute-force
summation over the path lengths of each control message
including the topology verification stage results with total hop
count of Lopt(2 log2(Lopt)− 1) + 2. With per hop switching
delay of τ , the latency T is sandwiched as:
(3Lopt − 2)× τ ≤ T ≤ [Lopt(2 log2(Lopt)− 1) + 2]× τ
To put things into perspective, for data center scale operations
with as much as 216 = 65536 links and τ = 1µs, the
lowest latency is in the order of hundreds of milliseconds and
the highest latency is in the order of seconds (to be exact
196.6ms ≤ T ≤ 2.032 seconds).2 For a moderate size topol-
ogy with about 1024 links, the worst case latency becomes
less than 20 ms with as low delays as 3 ms achievable.
B. Speeding Up Search Time
To reduce the latency of failure location below 1 second
mark, we can trade off latency with the overhead of control
messages and/or forwarding rules.
1) More Control Messages: Instead of just performing
a sequential search on the logical ring, we can use more
control packets to parallelize the search. If we allow m
control message to be injected in parallel, we can inspect
(m + 1) segments of the ring at once. We can then re-
duce the number of iterations to ⌈logm+1(Lopt)⌉. Including
the topology verification stage, the total number of control
messages M become 1 + m⌈logm+1(Lopt)⌉. In exchange, a
trivial upper bound on latency (TUB) can be expressed as
(Lopt + 2Lopt⌈logm+1(Lopt)⌉)× τ . Below, we tabulate TUB
in seconds for a large topology with 65536 links and τ = 1µs.
m 1 2 3 4 40 255 65535
M 17 23 25 29 121 511 65536
TUB 2.16 1.51 1.11 0.98 0.46 0.33 0.20
2We take the value of τ from http://pica8.org/documents/pica8-datasheet-
48x1gbe-p3290-p3295.pdf that lists the switching latency of packets of size
64 bytes or less at 1µs. Our control packets are indeed short messages.
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Fig. 5: An example of hidden undetectable failure.
Sequential search requires 17 messages and (in previous
section) we computed the worst case delay as 2.032 sec. The
upper bound above for 17 messages is relatively tight at 2.16
sec. At full parallelization with 65536 control messages all
injected at the same time each checking a separate link, the
upper bound on latency becomes as low as 200 ms. Using 29
messages total, we can achieve sub-second latency for locating
the link failure even for this large topology. Since the control
messages are short (e.g., <64 bytes), one can go up to m
= 255 parallel messages that would incur a manageable total
load (e.g., <16 KByte per iteration round).
2) More Static Rules: Instead of starting the search only
in the clockwise direction, we can use both directions on the
ring. To enable this, we can install bounce back rules at each
vi on the ring topology to reverse Wrevopt onto Wopt. For this
we can assign a second unique IP address IP (2)vi to each vi
and install a rule at each f(vi) as follows:
If source IP == IPB ∧ destination IP == IP (2)vi then set
source IP to IPA and send back to incoming port.
After determining which half of the ring has a faulty part,
provided that the fault is closer to the injection point in the
counter clockwise direction, we can switch the search direction
to shorten the walk distance. For large topologies, this would
cut down the worst case latency of locating a single link failure
roughly by one half. Note that adding a second set of bounce
back rules still preserves order optimality in number of static
rules, which is now 4Lopt − 2κ(Wopt) ≤ 8|E|.
This reduction in latency can be combined with the results
of the previous section and the upper bounds stated there can
again be roughly reduced by one half for small m as new trivial
upper bound becomes (Lopt+Lopt⌈logm+1(Lopt)⌉)×τ . E.g.,
for m = 4, TUB ≈ 0.52 seconds for 65536 links.
V. LOCATING MULTIPLE LINK FAILURES
For arbitrary topologies, one cannot guarantee to locate
multiple link failures. A trivial example of this is given
in Fig. 5. Forwarding plane is a line topology such that a
controller has only one of the end points in its D. When there
are multiple failures on this topology, only the closest failure
can be located and all the failures that are further away from
controllers D are hidden and undetectable. E.g., the failure
between s3 and s4 in Fig. 5 is not detectable by C1.
Nevertheless, by building on the solution in the previous
section, we can detect more than one link failure in a proba-
bilistic sense. First, a controller may have a switch in its D in
multiple locations on the logical ring. Further, it has typically
more than one switch in its D at any given time. Thus, it can
tap on the logical ring at multiple points and locate the first
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Fig. 7: Average number of detected failures per topology
across all 4-failure patterns with |D| = 1.
failure in the clockwise direction from each of these points.
If the second set of bounce back rules are also installed, it
can also detect potentially other failures that are closest to
each injection point in the counter clockwise direction. Note
that there are no guarantees that these detected failures map
actually to the same link. Thus, with probability one, we locate
at least one link failure and at non-zero probabilities up to
2×β(D,Wopt) failures might be located. Here, β(D,Wopt)
counts the total multiplicity of switches in D on Wopt.
VI. EVALUATIONS OVER REAL TOPOLOGIES
In the previous sections, we already presented upper and
lower bounds on various performance metrics as well as
provided some numerical values mainly for latency. For asym-
metric failures, the performance can be computed easily as
κ(Wopt) = 0 and Lopt = 2|E|. Therefore, our evaluations
mainly focus on the performance of symmetric failure case.
For evaluations, we use the public topologies posted in Internet
Topology Zoo with their sizes varying from a few links to more
than one hundred links. We mainly investigate two things:
(i) How close do we get to the lower bounds established for
symmetric failure cases? (ii) If we install bounce back rules for
both Wopt and Wrevopt, how many failed links do we locate?
Fig. 6 plots the ratio (Lopt − κ(Wopt))/(|E| + |B|) as a
function of the topology size in number of links/edges |E|.
When the ratio is one, Algorithm 1 becomes an optimum
solution for topology verification. For almost 60% of the
topologies, indeed our solution is optimum. The ratio remains
at 1.14 or below and except for 2 topologies at 1.1 or below
indicating that for real network topologies we remain with at
most 14% of the optimum and 10% of the optimum for 98%
of the topologies. Another observation is that the performance
does not seem to be too sensitive against the topology size.
Fig. 7 quantifies how many failures we can actually locate.
Provably, we already know that we can locate at least one. For
9evaluations, we fixed the number of failures, but exhaustively
iterated over every failure combination on a given topology.
We then assumed that there is only one switch in D of a
particular controller and iterated over each switch as a possible
injection candidate to find out as a function of injection point
how many failures could be located. In the figure, we plot
the average number of detected failures where the average
is computed over all failure patterns and injection points for
a given topology. We fixed the number of failures to four as
larger number of failures was computationally quite prohibitive
for us. As it can be seen, for a great majority of cases, we
could actually locate two or more failures on average. For one
topology with as much as 39 edges, the average was at 3.6 (i.e.,
for many failure patterns we could detect all four failed links).
Note that although we consider only one switch in the control
domain of the inspecting controller, the same switch can occur
multiple times on the constructed logical ring. If a switch
occurs twice, using both Wopt and Wrevopt, directions we can
locate up to four failures. In our evaluations, we observed that
a switch can occur three times for some topologies. Clearly,
not all occurrences lead to locating new failures. We also have
not observed any strong correlation between detecting more
than one failure and the topology size.
VII. RELATED WORK
There are several works both for classical networks and
SDNs that are closely related to ours. In all-optical networks,
fault diagnosis (or failure detection) is done by using mon-
itoring trails (m-trails) [1], [6], [13], [14]. An m-trail is a
pre-configured optical path. Supervisory optical signals are
launched at the starting node of an m-trail and a monitor
is attached to the ending node. When the monitor fails to
receive the supervisory signal, it detects that some link(s)
along the trail has failed. The objective is then to design a
set of m-trails with minimum cost such that all link failures
up to a certain level can be uniquely identified. Although the
problem set up looks very similar, there are some fundamental
differences in our work: (1) Monitor locations are analogous to
the switches in set D. Unlike all optical networking scenarios,
in our problem set up, these monitor locations are not known
a priori. Our solutions would work regardless of where the
monitors are placed. (2) In all-optical networks, there is a
per link cost measured by the sum bandwidth usage of all
m-trails traversing that link. In our set up, the costs are in
number of control packets and number of static forwarding
rules. Furthermore, in our set up, a given static forwarding
rule can be (and are in fact) reused by different walks. There
are also works on graph-constrained group testing [2], [3] that
is very similar to fault diagnosis in all-optical networks, and
share the same fundamental differences.
SDN era has also generated many recent works on network
debugging, fault diagnosis and detection, policy verification,
dynamic and static state analysis [5], [7]–[9], [12]. As far as
we are aware of, all these works are complementary to our
work in terms of the problem spaces they specifically target. In
[7], for instance, authors piggyback on existing rules installed
for data flows to identify which header space can locate link
failures given these rules. Installing static forwarding rules to
be used for later forwarding plane diagnosis via control flows
and optimizing the associated costs are the main features we
have that are also absent in prior art on SDNs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented new results on how to diagnose forwarding
plane using static forwarding rules in SDNs. Our results are
provably either optimal or order optimal in number of static
forwarding rules and number of control messages. For topol-
ogy verification, the evaluations over real topologies revealed
that our solution stayed within 14% of the lower bound and
for more than half the topologies matched the lower bound
in number of control messages. We also presented latency
performance. At the expense of slight increase in bandwidth
usage and forwarding rules, sub-second delays in locating link
failures even at data-center scale topologies are achievable.
Our solutions guarantee locating a single link failure, but can
also probabilistically locate multiple link failures as dictated
by the topology and failure patterns. We lack a closed form
tight approximation of finding these probabilities for arbitrary
topologies and it remains as a future work.
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